United States Statutes at Large/Volume 2/6th Congress/2nd Session/Chapter 15

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United States Statutes at Large, Volume 2
United States Congress

Public Acts of the Sixth Congress, 2nd Session, Chapter XV

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The District of Columbia Organic Act of 1801 (officially An Act Concerning the District of Columbia) (6th Congress, 2nd Sess., ch. 15, 2 Stat. 103, February 27, 1801) is an Organic Act enacted by the United States Congress in accordance with Article 1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution. It formally placed the District of Columbia under the control of the United States Congress and organized the unincorporated territory within the District into two counties: Washington County to the north and east of the Potomac River and Alexandria County to the west and south. The charters of the existing cities of Georgetown and Alexandria were left in place and no change was made to their status. The common law of both Maryland and Virginia remained in force within the District. A court was established in each of the new counties. Warning: template has been deprecated.

2399964United States Statutes at Large, Volume 2 — Public Acts of the Sixth Congress, 2nd Session, Chapter XVUnited States Congress

Feb. 27, 1801.

Chap. XV.—An Act concerning the district of Columbia.^[1]

Laws of Virginia and Maryland continued in force in the district.Section 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the laws of the state of Virginia, as they now exist, shall be and continue in force in that part of the District of Columbia, which was ceded by the said state to the United States, and by them accepted for the permanent seat of government; and that the laws of the state of Maryland, as they now exist, shall be and continue in force in that part of the said district, which was ceded by that state to the United States, and by them accepted as aforesaid.

It shall be formed into two counties.
Washington county.
Alexandria county.Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That the said district of Columbia shall be formed into two counties; one county shall contain all that part of said district, which lies on the east side of the river Potomac, together with the islands therein, and shall be called the county of Washington; the other county shall contain all that part of said district, which lies on the west side of said river, and shall be called the county of Alexandria; and the said river in its whole course through said district shall be taken and deemed to all intents and purposes to be within both of said counties.

Circuit court established in it.
To consist of one chief judge and two assistant judges.Sec. 3. Be it further enacted, That there shall be a court in said district, which shall be called the circuit court of the district of Columbia; and the said court and the judges thereof shall have all the powers by law vested in the circuit courts and the judges of the circuit courts of the United States. Said court shall consist of one chief judge and two assistant judges resident within said district, to hold their respective offices during good behaviour; any two of whom shall constitute a quorum; and each of the said judges shall, before he enter on his office, take the oath or affirmation provided by law to be taken by the judges of the circuit courts of the United States; and said court shall have power to appoint a clerk of the court in each of said counties, who shall take the oath and give a bond with sureties, in the manner directed for clerks of the district courts in the act to establish the judiciary of the United States.

Sessions of the court in Washington county,
in Alexandria county.Sec. 4. Be it further enacted, That the said court shall, annually, hold four sessions in each of said counties, to commence as follows, to wit: for the county of Washington, at the city of Washington, on the fourth Mondays of March, June, September and December; for the county of Alexandria, at Alexandria, on the second Mondays of January, April, July, and the first Monday of October.

Subjects for the cognizance of the court.Sec. 5. Be it further enacted, That said court shall have cognizance of all crimes and offences committed within said district, and of all cases in law and equity between parties, both or either of which shall be resident or be found within said district, and also of all actions or suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, in which the United States shall be plaintiffs and complainants; and of all seizures on land or water, and all penalties and forfeitures made, arising or accruing under the laws of the United States.

Where local actions shall be commenced.
No suits to be brought, but against inhabitants or persons found in the district.
A marshal to be appointed for the district.Sec. 6. Provided, and be it further enacted, That all local actions shall be commenced in their proper counties, and that no action or suit shall be brought before said court, by any original process against any person, who shall not be an inhabitant of, or found within said district, at the time of serving the writ.

Sec. 7. Be it further enacted, That there shall be a marshal for the said district, who shall have the custody of all the gaols of said counties, and be accountable for the safe keeping of all prisoners legally committed therein; and he shall be appointed for the same term, shall take the same oath, give a bond with sureties in the same manner, shall have generally, within said district, the same powers, and perform the same duties, as is by law directed and provided in the case of marshals of the United States.

Writs of error and appeal.Sec. 8. Be it further enacted, That any final judgment, order of decree in said circuit court, wherein the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, shall exceed the value of one hundred dollars, may be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the supreme court of the United States, by writ of error or appeal,^[2] which shall be prosecuted in the same manner, under the same regulations, and the same proceedings shall be had therein, as is or shall be provided in the case of writs of error on judgments, or appeals upon orders or decrees, rendered in the circuit court of the United States.

An attorney to be appointed.
Allowances to the attorney, marshal and clerks.Sec. 9. Be it further enacted, That there shall be appointed an attorney of the United States for said district, who shall take the oath and perform all the duties required of the district attornies of the United States; and the said attorney, marshal and clerks, shall be entitled to receive for their respective services, the same fees, perquisites and emoluments, which are by law allowed respectively to the attorney, marshal and clerk of the United States, for the district of Maryland.

Sec. 10. Be it further enacted, That the chief judge, to be appointed by virtue of this act, shall receive an annual salary of two Compensation of the judges.thousand dollars, and the two assistant judges, of sixteen hundred dollars each, to be paid quarterly, at the treasury of the United States.^[3]

Justices of the peace to be appointed.
Their jurisdiction.Sec. 11. Be it further enacted, That there shall be appointed in and for each of the said counties, such number of discreet persons to be justices of the peace, as the President of the United States shall from time to time think expedient, to continue in office five years; and such justices, having taken an oath for the faithful and impartial discharge of the duties of the office, shall, in all matters, civil and criminal, and in whatever relates to the conservation of the peace, have all the powers vested in, and shall perform all the duties required of, justices of the peace, as individual magistrates, by the laws herein before continued in force in those parts of said district, for which they shall have been respectively appointed; and they shall have cognizance in personal demands to the value of twenty dollars, exclusive of costs; which sum they shall not exceed, any law to the contrary notwithstanding; and they shall be entitled to receive for their services the fees allowed for like services by the laws herein before adopted and continued, in the eastern part of said district.

Registers of wills and judges of the orphans’ court to be appointed.
Act of May 19, 1828, ch. 59.Sec. 12. And be it further enacted, That there shall be appointed in and for each of the said counties, a register of wills, and a judge to be called the judge of the orphans’ court, who shall each take an oath for the faithful and impartial discharge of the duties of his office; and shall have all the powers, perform all the duties, and receive the like fees, as are exercised, performed, and received, by the registers of wills and judges of the orphans’ court, within the state of Maryland; and appeals from the said courts shall be to the circuit court of said district, who shall therein have all the powers of the chancellor of the said state.

How to obtain execution within the district, upon judgments already rendered in courts of Maryland and Virginia.Sec. 13. And be it further enacted, That in all cases where judgments or decrees have been obtained, or thereafter shall be obtained, on suits now depending in any of the courts of the commonwealth of Virginia, or of the state of Maryland, where the defendant resides or has property within the district of Columbia, it shall be lawful for the plaintiff in such case upon filing an exemplification of the record and proceedings in such suits, with the clerk of the court of the county where the defendant resides, or his property may be found, to sue out writs of execution thereon, returnable to the said court, which shall be proceeded on, in the same manner as if the judgment or decree had originally been obtained in said court.

Suits in the courts of Hustings for Alexandria and Georgetown continued to the circuit court.Sec. 14. And be it further enacted, That all actions, suits, process, pleadings, and other proceedings of what nature or kind soever, depending or existing in the courts of Hustings for the towns of Alexandria and Georgetown, shall be, and hereby are continued over to the circuit courts to be holden by virtue of this act, within the district of Columbia, in manner following; that is to say: all such as shall then be depending and undetermined, before the court of Hustings for the town of Alexandria, to the next circuit court hereby directed to be holden in the town of Alexandria; and all such as shall then be depending and undetermined, before the court of Hustings for Georgetown, to the next circuit court hereby directed to be holden in the city of Washington: Provided nevertheless, that where the personal demand in such cases, exclusive of costs, does not exceed the value of twenty dollars, the justices of the peace within their respective counties, shall have cognizance thereof.

Test of writs.Sec. 15. And be it further enacted, That all writs and processes whatsoever, which shall hereafter issue from the courts hereby established within the district, shall be tested in the name of the chief judge of the district of Columbia.

Saving of the rights of corporations.Sec. 16. And be it further enacted, That nothing in this act contained shall in any wise alter, impeach or impair the rights, granted by or derived from the acts of incorporation of Alexandria and Georgetown, or of any other body corporate or politic, within the said district, except so far as related to the judicial powers of the corporations of Georgetown and Alexandria.

Approved, February 27, 1801.

↑ District of Columbia. The acts for the government and administration of justice in the District of Columbia, are:
1. An act for establishing the temporary and permanent seat of the government of the United States, July 16, 1790, chap. 28.
2. An act supplementary to an act, entitled “An act concerning the District of Columbia,” March 3, 1801, chap. 24.
3. An act concerning the District of Columbia, February 27, 1801, chap. 15.
4. An act additional to an act amendatory of an act entitled, “An act concerning the District of Columbia,” May 3, 1802, chap. 53.
5. An act to amend the judicial system of the United States, April 29, 1802, chap. 31, sec. 24.
6. An act for the relief of insolvent debtors within the District of Columbia, March 3, 1803, chap. 20.
7. An act to extend the jurisdiction of justices of the peace in the recovery of debts, in the District of Columbia, March 1, 1823, chap. 24.
8. An act respecting the adjournment of the circuit court of the District of Columbia, March 3, 1825.
9. An act altering the times of holding the circuit courts in the District of Columbia, May 20, 1826, chap. 131.
10. An act to establish a criminal court in the District of Columbia, July 7, 1838, chap. 192.
11. An act to restrain the circulation of small notes as a currency in the District of Columbia, and for other purposes, July 7, 1838, chap. 212.
12. Resolution directing the manner in which certain laws of the District of Columbia shall be executed, March 2, 1839.
13. An act for granting possessions, enrolling conveyances and securing the estates of purchasers within the District of Columbia, May 31, 1832, chap. 112.
14. An act changing the times of holding the courts in the District of Columbia, May 31, 1832, chap. 114.
Act of February 30, 1839, chap. 30.
The decisions of the courts of the United States upon this and other statutes relating to the District of Columbia, and other questions arising in the district, have been:
The act of Congress of 27 February, 1801, concerning the District of Columbia, directs that writs of error shall be prosecuted in the same manner, under the same regulations, and the same proceedings shall be had thereon, as is or shall be provided in case of writs of error on judgments, or appeals upon orders or decrees, rendered in the circuit courts of the United States. United States v. Hooe et al., 1 Cranch, 318; 1 Cond. Rep. 322.
By the separation of the District of Columbia from the state of Maryland, the residents in that part of Maryland which became a part of the district ceased to be citizens of the state. Reilly, Appellant v. Lamar et al., 2 Cranch, 344; 1 Cond. Rep. 419.
A citizen of the District of Columbia, could not be discharged by the insolvent law of Maryland, out of the district. Ibid.
A citizen of the District of Columbia, cannot maintain an action in the circuit court of the United States, out of the district; he not being a citizen of a state within the meaning of the provision in the law of the United States, regulating the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States. Hepburn and Dundas v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch, 445; 1 Cond. Rep. 444.
A justice of the peace, in the District of Columbia, is an officer of the government of the United States; and is exempt from militia duty. Wise v. Withers, 3 Cranch, 331; 1 Cond. Rep. 552.
Under the sixth and eighth sections of the act of assembly of Virginia, of the 22d of December, 1794, property pledged to the Mutual Assurance Society, &c. continues liable for assessments, on account of the losses insured against, in the hands of a bona fide purchaser, without notice. The Mutual Assurance Society v. Watts’ Ex’rs, 1 Wheat. 279; 3 Cond. Rep. 570.
A mere change of sovereignty produces no change in the state of rights existing in the soil; and the cession of the District of Columbia to the national government did not affect the lien created by the above act on real property situate in the town of Alexandria; though the personal character or liability of a member of the society could not be thereby forced on a purchaser of such property. Ibid.
Congress has authority to impose a direct tax on the District of Columbia, in proportion to the census directed to be taken by the Constitution. Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 317; 4 Cond. Rep. 660.
Congress, when legislating for the District of Columbia, under the fifth section of the first article of the constitution, is still the legislature of the Union, and its acts are the laws of the United States. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264; 5 Cond. Rep. 90.
An act of the legislature of Maryland, passed the 19th of December, 1791, entitled “An act concerning the territory of Columbia, and the city of Washington,” which, by the 6th section, provides for the holding of lands by “foreigners,” is an enabling act; and applies to those only who could not take lands without the provisions of that law. It enables a “foreigner” to take in the same manner as if he were a citizen. Spratt v. Spratt, 1 Peters, 349.
A foreigner who becomes a citizen, is no longer a foreigner, within the view of the act. Thus, after purchase, lands vested in him as a citizen; not by virtue of the act of the legislature of Maryland, but because of his acquiring the rights of citizenship. Ibid.
Land in the county of Washington, and District of Columbia, purchased by a foreigner, before naturalization, was held by him under the law of Maryland, and might be transmitted to the relations of the purchasers, who were foreigners; and the capacity so to transmit those lands, is given, absolutely, by this act, and is not affected by his becoming a citizen; but passes to his heirs and relations, precisely as if he had remained a foreigner. Ibid.
The supreme court of the United States has jurisdiction of appeals from the orphans’ court, through the circuit court for the county of Washington, by virtue of the act of Congress of February 13, 1801; and by the act of Congress subsequently passed, the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, must exceed the value of one thousand dollars, in order to entitle the party to an appeal. Nicholls et al. v. Hodges’ Ex’rs, 1 Peters, 565.
The statute of Elizabeth is in force in the District of Columbia. Cathcart et al. v. Robinson, 5 Peters, 264.
The levy court of Washington county is not entitled to one half of all the fines, penalties, and forfeitures imposed by the circuit court in cases at common law, and under the acts of Congress, as well as the acts of assembly of Maryland, adopted by Congress as the law of the District of Columbia. Levy Court of Washington v. Ringgold, 5 Peters, 451.
The supreme court of the United States has no jurisdiction of causes brought before it, upon a certificate of division of opinion of the judges of the circuit court for the District of Columbia. The appellate jurisdiction, in respect to that court, extends only to its final judgments and decrees. Ross v. Triplett. 3 Wheat. 600; 4 Cond. Rep. 351.
By the insolvent law of Maryland, of January 3, 1800, the chancellor of Maryland could not discharge one who was an inhabitant of the District of Columbia, after the separation from Maryland, unless previous to that separation he had entitled himself to a discharge by performing all the requisites of the act. Reilly v. Lamar et al. 2 Cranch, 344; 1 Cond. Rep, 419.
No appeal or writ of error lies, in a criminal case, from the judgment of the circuit court of the District of Columbia, to the supreme court of the United States: the appellate jurisdiction given by the act of Congress, is confined to civil cases. United States v. Moore, 3 Cranch, 159; 1 Cond. Rep. 480.
There is, in the District of Columbia, no division of powers between the general and state governments. Congress has the entire control over the district, for every purpose of government: and it is reasonable to suppose that, in organizing a judicial department in the district, all the judicial power, necessary for the purpose of government, would be vested in the courts of justice. Kendall, Postmaster General v. The United States, 12 Peters, 524.
The circuit court of the United States, for the District of Columbia, has a right to award a mandamus to the postmaster-general of the United States, requiring him to pass to the credit of certain contractors for conveying the mail of the United States, a sum found to be due to them by the solicitor of the treasury of the United States, the solicitor acting under the special provisions of an act of Congress. Ibid.
There can be no doubt, that, in the state of Maryland, a writ of mandamus might be issued to an executive officer, commanding him to perform a ministerial act, required of him by the laws: and if it would lie in that state, there can be no good reason why it should not lie in the District of Columbia, in analogous cases. Ibid.
The powers of the supreme court of the United States, and of the circuit courts of the United States, to issue writs of mandamus, granted by the fourteenth section of the judiciary act of 1789, is only for the purpose of bringing the case to a final judgment or decree, so that it may be reviewed. The mandamus does not direct the inferior court how to proceed, but only that it must proceed, according to its own judgment, to a final determination; otherwise it cannot be reviewed in the appellate court. It is different in the circuit court of the District of Columbia, under the adoption of the laws of Maryland, which included the common law. Ibid.
The power of the circuit court of the District of Columbia, to exercise the jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus to a public officer, to do an act required of him by law, results from the third section of the act of Congress of February 27, 1804; which declares that the court and judges thereof shall have all the powers by law vested in the circuit courts of the United States. The circuit courts referred to, were those established by the act of February 13, 1801. The repeal of that law, fifteen months afterwards, and after that law had gone into operation, under the act of February 27, 1801, could not in any manner affect that law, any further than was provided by the repealing act. Ibid.
The circuit courts of the United States, sitting in the states of the Union, have no jurisdiction in a case in which a citizen of the District of Columbia is plaintiff. Westcott’s Lessee v. Inhabitants, &c. Peters’ C. C. R. 45.
The act of Congress of June, 1822, authorizes any person to whom administration has been granted by the states of the United States, to prosecute claims by suits in the District of Columbia, in the same manner as if the same had been granted by proper authority, in the District of Columbia, to such persons. The power is limited by its terms to the institution of suits, and does not authorize suits against an executor or administrator. The effect of this law was to make all debts due by persons in the District of Columbia, not local assets, for which the administrator was bound to account in the courts of the district, but general assets which he had full authority to receive, and for which he was bound to account in the courts of the state from which he derived his letters of administration. Vaughan et al. v. Northup et al., 15 Peters’ Rep. 1.
The courts of the United States in the District of Columbia, have a like jurisdiction upon personal property, with the courts in England, and in the states of the Union; and in the absence of statutory provisions, in the trial of them they must apply the same common law principle which regulates the mode of bringing such actions, the pleadings and the proof. M‘Kenna v. Fiske, 17 Peters’ Rep. 245.
↑ By an act entitled, “An act to limit the right of appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the District of Columbia, passed April 2, 1816, chap. 39, it is provided that no cause shall be removed from the circuit court of the District of Columbia, unless the matter in dispute in the cause shall be of the value of one thousand dollars and upwards. But when a party in a cause shall deem himself aggrieved by any final judgment or decree of the said circuit court, where the matter in dispute shall be of the value of $100, and of less value than $1000, on a petition to a justice of the supreme court, if the said justice shall be of opinion that errors in the proceedings of the court involve questions of law of such extensive interest and operation as to render the final judgment of the supreme court desirable, the case may be removed at the discretion of the said justice.
↑ An act concerning the District of Columbia, February 27, 1801, chap. 15; an act to increase the salaries of the judges of the circuit court for the District of Columbia, March 3, 1811; an act to increase the salaries of the judges of the circuit court for the District of Columbia, April 20, 1818; an act concerning the orphans’ court of Alexandria county, in the District of Columbia, May 19, 1828, chap. 59.

[p139-1] District of Columbia. The acts for the government and administration of justice in the District of Columbia, are:
1. An act for establishing the temporary and permanent seat of the government of the United States, July 16, 1790, chap. 28.
2. An act supplementary to an act, entitled “An act concerning the District of Columbia,” March 3, 1801, chap. 24.
3. An act concerning the District of Columbia, February 27, 1801, chap. 15.
4. An act additional to an act amendatory of an act entitled, “An act concerning the District of Columbia,” May 3, 1802, chap. 53.
5. An act to amend the judicial system of the United States, April 29, 1802, chap. 31, sec. 24.
6. An act for the relief of insolvent debtors within the District of Columbia, March 3, 1803, chap. 20.
7. An act to extend the jurisdiction of justices of the peace in the recovery of debts, in the District of Columbia, March 1, 1823, chap. 24.
8. An act respecting the adjournment of the circuit court of the District of Columbia, March 3, 1825.
9. An act altering the times of holding the circuit courts in the District of Columbia, May 20, 1826, chap. 131.
10. An act to establish a criminal court in the District of Columbia, July 7, 1838, chap. 192.
11. An act to restrain the circulation of small notes as a currency in the District of Columbia, and for other purposes, July 7, 1838, chap. 212.
12. Resolution directing the manner in which certain laws of the District of Columbia shall be executed, March 2, 1839.
13. An act for granting possessions, enrolling conveyances and securing the estates of purchasers within the District of Columbia, May 31, 1832, chap. 112.
14. An act changing the times of holding the courts in the District of Columbia, May 31, 1832, chap. 114.
Act of February 30, 1839, chap. 30.
The decisions of the courts of the United States upon this and other statutes relating to the District of Columbia, and other questions arising in the district, have been:
The act of Congress of 27 February, 1801, concerning the District of Columbia, directs that writs of error shall be prosecuted in the same manner, under the same regulations, and the same proceedings shall be had thereon, as is or shall be provided in case of writs of error on judgments, or appeals upon orders or decrees, rendered in the circuit courts of the United States. United States v. Hooe et al., 1 Cranch, 318; 1 Cond. Rep. 322.
By the separation of the District of Columbia from the state of Maryland, the residents in that part of Maryland which became a part of the district ceased to be citizens of the state. Reilly, Appellant v. Lamar et al., 2 Cranch, 344; 1 Cond. Rep. 419.
A citizen of the District of Columbia, could not be discharged by the insolvent law of Maryland, out of the district. Ibid.
A citizen of the District of Columbia, cannot maintain an action in the circuit court of the United States, out of the district; he not being a citizen of a state within the meaning of the provision in the law of the United States, regulating the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States. Hepburn and Dundas v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch, 445; 1 Cond. Rep. 444.
A justice of the peace, in the District of Columbia, is an officer of the government of the United States; and is exempt from militia duty. Wise v. Withers, 3 Cranch, 331; 1 Cond. Rep. 552.
Under the sixth and eighth sections of the act of assembly of Virginia, of the 22d of December, 1794, property pledged to the Mutual Assurance Society, &c. continues liable for assessments, on account of the losses insured against, in the hands of a bona fide purchaser, without notice. The Mutual Assurance Society v. Watts’ Ex’rs, 1 Wheat. 279; 3 Cond. Rep. 570.
A mere change of sovereignty produces no change in the state of rights existing in the soil; and the cession of the District of Columbia to the national government did not affect the lien created by the above act on real property situate in the town of Alexandria; though the personal character or liability of a member of the society could not be thereby forced on a purchaser of such property. Ibid.
Congress has authority to impose a direct tax on the District of Columbia, in proportion to the census directed to be taken by the Constitution. Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 317; 4 Cond. Rep. 660.
Congress, when legislating for the District of Columbia, under the fifth section of the first article of the constitution, is still the legislature of the Union, and its acts are the laws of the United States. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264; 5 Cond. Rep. 90.
An act of the legislature of Maryland, passed the 19th of December, 1791, entitled “An act concerning the territory of Columbia, and the city of Washington,” which, by the 6th section, provides for the holding of lands by “foreigners,” is an enabling act; and applies to those only who could not take lands without the provisions of that law. It enables a “foreigner” to take in the same manner as if he were a citizen. Spratt v. Spratt, 1 Peters, 349.
A foreigner who becomes a citizen, is no longer a foreigner, within the view of the act. Thus, after purchase, lands vested in him as a citizen; not by virtue of the act of the legislature of Maryland, but because of his acquiring the rights of citizenship. Ibid.
Land in the county of Washington, and District of Columbia, purchased by a foreigner, before naturalization, was held by him under the law of Maryland, and might be transmitted to the relations of the purchasers, who were foreigners; and the capacity so to transmit those lands, is given, absolutely, by this act, and is not affected by his becoming a citizen; but passes to his heirs and relations, precisely as if he had remained a foreigner. Ibid.
The supreme court of the United States has jurisdiction of appeals from the orphans’ court, through the circuit court for the county of Washington, by virtue of the act of Congress of February 13, 1801; and by the act of Congress subsequently passed, the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, must exceed the value of one thousand dollars, in order to entitle the party to an appeal. Nicholls et al. v. Hodges’ Ex’rs, 1 Peters, 565.
The statute of Elizabeth is in force in the District of Columbia. Cathcart et al. v. Robinson, 5 Peters, 264.
The levy court of Washington county is not entitled to one half of all the fines, penalties, and forfeitures imposed by the circuit court in cases at common law, and under the acts of Congress, as well as the acts of assembly of Maryland, adopted by Congress as the law of the District of Columbia. Levy Court of Washington v. Ringgold, 5 Peters, 451.
The supreme court of the United States has no jurisdiction of causes brought before it, upon a certificate of division of opinion of the judges of the circuit court for the District of Columbia. The appellate jurisdiction, in respect to that court, extends only to its final judgments and decrees. Ross v. Triplett. 3 Wheat. 600; 4 Cond. Rep. 351.
By the insolvent law of Maryland, of January 3, 1800, the chancellor of Maryland could not discharge one who was an inhabitant of the District of Columbia, after the separation from Maryland, unless previous to that separation he had entitled himself to a discharge by performing all the requisites of the act. Reilly v. Lamar et al. 2 Cranch, 344; 1 Cond. Rep, 419.
No appeal or writ of error lies, in a criminal case, from the judgment of the circuit court of the District of Columbia, to the supreme court of the United States: the appellate jurisdiction given by the act of Congress, is confined to civil cases. United States v. Moore, 3 Cranch, 159; 1 Cond. Rep. 480.
There is, in the District of Columbia, no division of powers between the general and state governments. Congress has the entire control over the district, for every purpose of government: and it is reasonable to suppose that, in organizing a judicial department in the district, all the judicial power, necessary for the purpose of government, would be vested in the courts of justice. Kendall, Postmaster General v. The United States, 12 Peters, 524.
The circuit court of the United States, for the District of Columbia, has a right to award a mandamus to the postmaster-general of the United States, requiring him to pass to the credit of certain contractors for conveying the mail of the United States, a sum found to be due to them by the solicitor of the treasury of the United States, the solicitor acting under the special provisions of an act of Congress. Ibid.
There can be no doubt, that, in the state of Maryland, a writ of mandamus might be issued to an executive officer, commanding him to perform a ministerial act, required of him by the laws: and if it would lie in that state, there can be no good reason why it should not lie in the District of Columbia, in analogous cases. Ibid.
The powers of the supreme court of the United States, and of the circuit courts of the United States, to issue writs of mandamus, granted by the fourteenth section of the judiciary act of 1789, is only for the purpose of bringing the case to a final judgment or decree, so that it may be reviewed. The mandamus does not direct the inferior court how to proceed, but only that it must proceed, according to its own judgment, to a final determination; otherwise it cannot be reviewed in the appellate court. It is different in the circuit court of the District of Columbia, under the adoption of the laws of Maryland, which included the common law. Ibid.
The power of the circuit court of the District of Columbia, to exercise the jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus to a public officer, to do an act required of him by law, results from the third section of the act of Congress of February 27, 1804; which declares that the court and judges thereof shall have all the powers by law vested in the circuit courts of the United States. The circuit courts referred to, were those established by the act of February 13, 1801. The repeal of that law, fifteen months afterwards, and after that law had gone into operation, under the act of February 27, 1801, could not in any manner affect that law, any further than was provided by the repealing act. Ibid.
The circuit courts of the United States, sitting in the states of the Union, have no jurisdiction in a case in which a citizen of the District of Columbia is plaintiff. Westcott’s Lessee v. Inhabitants, &c. Peters’ C. C. R. 45.
The act of Congress of June, 1822, authorizes any person to whom administration has been granted by the states of the United States, to prosecute claims by suits in the District of Columbia, in the same manner as if the same had been granted by proper authority, in the District of Columbia, to such persons. The power is limited by its terms to the institution of suits, and does not authorize suits against an executor or administrator. The effect of this law was to make all debts due by persons in the District of Columbia, not local assets, for which the administrator was bound to account in the courts of the district, but general assets which he had full authority to receive, and for which he was bound to account in the courts of the state from which he derived his letters of administration. Vaughan et al. v. Northup et al., 15 Peters’ Rep. 1.
The courts of the United States in the District of Columbia, have a like jurisdiction upon personal property, with the courts in England, and in the states of the Union; and in the absence of statutory provisions, in the trial of them they must apply the same common law principle which regulates the mode of bringing such actions, the pleadings and the proof. M‘Kenna v. Fiske, 17 Peters’ Rep. 245.

[2] By an act entitled, “An act to limit the right of appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the District of Columbia, passed April 2, 1816, chap. 39, it is provided that no cause shall be removed from the circuit court of the District of Columbia, unless the matter in dispute in the cause shall be of the value of one thousand dollars and upwards. But when a party in a cause shall deem himself aggrieved by any final judgment or decree of the said circuit court, where the matter in dispute shall be of the value of $100, and of less value than $1000, on a petition to a justice of the supreme court, if the said justice shall be of opinion that errors in the proceedings of the court involve questions of law of such extensive interest and operation as to render the final judgment of the supreme court desirable, the case may be removed at the discretion of the said justice.

[3] An act concerning the District of Columbia, February 27, 1801, chap. 15; an act to increase the salaries of the judges of the circuit court for the District of Columbia, March 3, 1811; an act to increase the salaries of the judges of the circuit court for the District of Columbia, April 20, 1818; an act concerning the orphans’ court of Alexandria county, in the District of Columbia, May 19, 1828, chap. 59.

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United States Statutes at Large/Volume 2/6th Congress/2nd Session/Chapter 15

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